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JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is taken from a JUDGMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION 
entered in the Second Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, by the Honorable Michael D. Lyon dated June 8, 1993. A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed July 7, 1993. This Court has 
jurisdiction under and pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
and Utah R.App.P. Rule 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the Court err in determining the just compensation in an 
eminent domain proceeding? 
When a Judgment of Just Compensation is "within the range of 
evidence11 of value as presented by expert testimony, the judgment 
must stand. (State Road Comm'n v. Hopkins. 29 Utah 2d 131, 507 
P.2d 57, 58-59 (1973); State Road Comm'n v. Taggart, 19 Utah 2d 
247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment of Just Compensation in an 
eminent domain proceeding. Landowners seek a reversal or additur 
for additional damages based upon increased value of junk-yard 
property, severance damages, potential future flooding, loss of a 
site for a business sign, destruction of the sign, cost of a wall, 
and for interest at a rate and application date different than as 
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provided by statute. The matter was tried to the Court and a 
Judgment entered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court properly granted summary judgment on the claim 
that eminent domain was barred by an "oral agreement." The subject 
properly was valued at its "highest and best" use, was not a 
"specialty" property, additional damages were not proven by 
competent evidence and the landowners are not entitled to an 
interest rate different than that prescribed by statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING DEFEN-
DANTS COUNTERCLAIM WAS PROPER 
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by the City to 
extend a public street. Landowners asserted, by Counterclaim, that 
the City could not condemn their property because of "implied" or 
"oral" terms of a land exchange agreement entered into between the 
City, landowners and others in May, 1983 (R.76-97). There is no 
term or provision in the 14-page agreement which, even remotely or 
impliedly, precludes the City from acquiring future property for 
street widening or extension. The Agreement contains the following 
integration clause: 
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"24. The parties hereby agree that this Agreement shall 
be deemed to contain all of the terms and 
conditions agreed upon, it being understood that 
there are no outside conditions, representations, 
warranties, or other agreement, written, oral or 
implied. 
25. The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall 
not be altered in any manner whatsoever except by a 
subsequent written supplemental agreement executed 
by all of the parties hereto." (R.87, ff24-25.) 
As a fully-integrated and complete expression of the agreement 
of the parties containing no term or provision prohibiting future 
condemnation, the Agreement cannot be augmented by oral testimony 
proffered to vary the Agreement. (E.I.E. v. St. Benedicts 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972); State Bank of Lehi v. 
Woolsev, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977).) 
II. 
EVEN IF NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, 
THE ALLEGED "ORAL AGREEMENT" NOT TO CONDEMN 
PROPERTY IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE VOID 
Assuming, arguendo, the existence of an alleged oral or 
implied agreement not to condemn made by a City official in 1983, 
said agreement could not prohibit or bar the City from thereafter 
exercising its public duty and trust to provide public facilities 
when the need arises: 
"The general rule that the power of eminent domain 
is inalienable applies whether the right is 
exercised directly by the legislature or through 
its delegated agencies. A municipal or a private 
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corporation to which the power of eminent domain 
has been delegated cannot lawfully contract that 
the power shall not be exercised or that it shall 
be restricted. The power is given as a public 
trust to be employed when the public needs require 
it; and when such an occasion arises, private 
contracts cannot stand in the way. Private parties 
cannot, by contract, in any way impair the power of 
eminent domain. Contracts attempting to do so are 
void as contrary to public policy. Parties cannot 
thus prevent available land from being taken or 
acquired, in a property proceeding, for a public 
use." (EMINENT DOMAIN, 26 Am. Jur. 2d §17 p.658.) 
III. 
THE PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY VALUED AT ITS 
"HIGHEST AND BEST USE" RATHER THAN AT ITS 
POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVE USE AS AN EXTENSION OF AN 
EXISTING JUNK YARD 
Landowners had used the property to the east of the piece 
"taken" as an auto salvage yard, and under their Agreement with the 
City were entitled to have the "take" and severed parcel to the 
west of the "taken" parcel rezoned to permit that usage. In 
eminent domain proceedings, however, the property must be valued at 
its highest and best use which may or may not be its present or 
owner-intended use. (State Road Comm'n v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167, 
397 P.2d 463, 464 (1964); Movie v. Salt Lake City. Ill Utah 210, 
176 P.2d 882, 887 (1947); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952); State v. Tedesco. 4 Utah 
2d 48, 291 P.2d 1028 (1955).) 
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The Landowner's appraiser did not even ascertain the "highest 
and best use" of the property prior to opining as to its fair 
market value.1 His comparable sales were of commercial properties 
rather than junk yard sales. The City's appraiser repeatedly 
opined that he appraised the property at its "highest and best 
use," which he determined was at some limited commercial 
application not requiring much depth.2 He repeatedly stated that 
the property would be more valuable appraised as "commercial," than 
as a potential salvage yard (T. 150-51). 
IV. 
THE "UNIQUE" OR "SPECIALTY USE" DOCTRINE DOES 
NOT APPLY TO USAGE WHICH DOES NOT REPRESENT 
THE "HIGHEST AND BEST USE" OF THE SUBJECT; OR 
WHERE THE SUBJECT IS CAPABLE OF VALUATION 
USING TRADITIONAL VALUATION METHODS 
Landowners argue that the subject property has a "special use" 
(i.e., potential junk-yard) which creates value above the fair 
market value of the subject property. The City's appraiser 
disagreed, maintaining that buyers of property with an anticipated 
*(T.74-75.) Indeed, Mr. Johnson seemed to have no concept of 
his task in eminent domain proceedings. He had never testified in 
an eminent domain case (T.61). He took a home study in eminent 
domain once he received this assignment (T.61). He inconsistently 
claims to have personally appraised 500 properties in 1992 (T.59), 
equivalent to 1-1/3 appraisals every day of the year, yet claims to 
have spend 50-55 hours doing this appraisal alone (T.59-60). 
2The severed parcel is roughly 39' x 115' at its widest point, 
and 29' x 115' at its narrowest point. 
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use as junk yard do not pay "commercial" prices and that his 
appraisal as "commercial" exceeds junk yard prices. 
Plaintiff readily concedes that there exists within eminent 
domain valuation law the concept that certain properties are so 
"unique" in nature that they cannot be fully valued under the 
traditional appraisal methodology by resorting to comparable market 
sales, capitalization of income, or reproduction cost less 
depreciation. This is best summarized in the leading treatise on 
eminent domain as follows: 
"It occasionally happens that a parcel of real 
estate taken by eminent domain is of such a nature, 
or is held or has been improved in such a manner, 
that, while it serves a useful purpose to its 
owner, if he desired to dispose of it he would be 
unable to sell it at anything like its real value. 
A church, or a college building, or a clubhouse 
located in a town in which there was but one 
religious society, or college, or club, might be 
worth all it cost to its owners, but it would be 
absolutely unmarketable. . . . In cases of such a 
character, therefore, market value will not 
generally be the measure of compensation. 
Hence, some other measure is sought and different 
means must be resorted to. So it is proper, in 
such a case to deduce market value from the 
intrinsic value of the property, and its value to 
the owners for their special purpose." NICHOLS, 
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, §12C.01[1] p.l2C-2-5. 
But utilization of the "specialty" valuation (income capitalization 
or cost less depreciation) is limited to and governed by several 
notable restrictions which are discussed herein: 
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(a) There must be a showing that the property 
cannot be valued by the traditional methods because no 
market exists, no rental or income figures exist, and 
application of the rule is therefore necessary. 
(b) The property must be "unique"—not merely have some 
unique features, for no two properties are identical and every 
commercial property has some unique features applicable solely 
to the owner's taste or needs. 
(c) Generally the rule is limited to properties like 
churches, schools, cemeteries and parks, although it has been 
applied to some commercial applications, but the rule is 
limited to "rare" or "exceptional" cases. 
A. THE TYPES OF PROPERTIES GENERALLY HELD TO 
BE "SPECIALTY" OR "SPECIAL USE" PROPER-
TIES ARE, CHURCHES, SCHOOLS, CEMETERIES 
AND PARKS AND NOT GENERAL COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTIES 
The Courts have generally defined properties that are 
"specialty" as those which meet a four-pronged test: 
"We find that there are several tests, all of which 
must be met, for an improvement to be considered a 
specialty. 
(1) It must be unique; 
(2) There must be no market for it and 
no sales; 
(3) it must be specially built for a 
special purpose for which it was 
designed; 
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(4) it must have a special use for that 
purpose (. . . and economic 
feasibility at that use . . . ) . " 
In re Park Street Vicinity of Bay Lane. Etc.. 325 
N.Y.S. 2d 555, 557-58 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1971) 
Examples of those types of properties held to be "specialty": 
• Originally designed and constructed Commercial Dry 
Cleaning Plant 
(City of New Rochelle v. Sound Operating Co. , 293 
N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1968)) 
• Country Club and Golf Course 
(Albany Country Club v. State. 241 N.Y.S.2d 604 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1963)) 
• Drive-In Theatre 
(Acme Theatres. Inc. v. State. 297 N.Y.S.2d 771 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969)) 
• Dairy and Milk Processing Plants 
(Mohawk Milk Association. Inc. v. State of New 
York. 153 N.Y.S.2d 725; Normals Kill Farm Dairy 
Co. v. State. 279 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 
1967)) 
• Electric Power Plants 
(Salzberg v. State. 261 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1963) 
• Stadium (New York City Polo Grounds) 
(Matter of New York (Cooaan) . 274 N.Y.S.2d 805 
(1963) 
• Beach and Cabana Club 
(In Re Park Street Vicinity of Bay Lane, etc.. 325 
N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1971)) 
• A Wharf-Rail Terminus 
(Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Pittsburgh Ft.W.S C. 
Ry.Co.. 75 N.E. 248 (1905)) 
• A "hurricane proof" Deep Water Wharf 
(Wronowski v. Redevelopment Agency, etc., 430 A.2d 
1284, 1286 (Conn.Sup.Ct. 1980)) 
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• Civil War Battle Site and Soldier's Hospital 
(Scott v. State, 326 S.W.2d 812 (Ark.1959)) 
• Radioactive Fail-Out Shelter with 8" steel and 
concrete walls and 4" Water Roof 
(State, Dep't of Highways v. Crossland. 207 So.2d 
898 (La.1968)) 
• Museum 
(City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 
217 N.E.2d 381 (1966)) 
• School 
(County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 228 N.E.2d 183 
(Ill.App. 1967)) 
• Duck Hunting Club 
(Central 111. Light Co. v. Porter, 239 N.E.2d 298 
(Ill.Appl. 1968)) 
Examples of those types of properties held not to be 
"specialty11: 
• An Auto Service Station, converted to auto sales, 
remodeled to dry cleaning with a drive-up window 
(City of Rochester v. S.C.Toth, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 
755# 756 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1977)) 
• Dairy Buildings, barns and garage used in dairy 
operations 
(Van Mol v. Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 402 P.2d 
320 (Kan.1965)) 
• Stone Monument Manufacturing Plant with Overhead 
Moveable Cranes 
fin re New York City Terminal Market, 244 N.Y.S.2d 
998 (1963)) 
• Amusement Park held not to "be like a church or 
railway terminal." 
(River Park Dist. v. Brand. 158 N.E.687 
(Sup.Ct.111. 1927)) 
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• Fish ponds 
(State Dep't of Highways v. Noble. 150 S.E.2d 174 
(Ga.App. 1966)) 
• Soap Factory 
fCitv of Chicago v. Farwell. 121 N.E. 794 
(Sup.Ct.111. 1919)) 
• Plumbing Supply Outlet 
(In Re Cecil Ave. Renewal Project. N.Y.R.-10, etc., 
317 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1970)) 
B. INVOCATION OF THE "SPECIAL USE" (COST 
LESS DEPRECIATION) FORMULA FOR DETER-
MINING VALUE IS RESTRICTED TO "RARE" OR 
"EXCEPTIONAL" CASES 
While the Courts have uniformly accepted the principal that 
the absence of a "market" for property should not bar a recovery 
for the property's take, the Courts are quick to point out that 
application of the "special use" or "specialty" formula of cost 
less depreciation is to be used " . . . only in those rare cases 
. . ." (State v. So.Pac.Co., 445 P.2d 186, 190 (Ariz.App. 
1968)(emphasis added)) or the " . . . few exceptional cases . . ." 
(City of Chicago v. Farwell, 121 N.E.795, 797 (111. 1919) (emphasis 
added).) Only where ". . . the character of the property 
absolutely precludes any ascertainment of the market value" may the 
cost less depreciation be utilized. (State Ex Rel. Herman v. 
So.Pac.Co.. 445 P.2d 186, 189 (Ariz.App. 1968), citing, Pima County 
v. DeConcini, 79 Ariz. 154, 285 P.2d 609 (1955); Phoenix Title & 
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Trust Co. v, State Ex Rel. Herman, 425 P.2d 434 (1967) (emphasis 
added).) 
C. A THRESHOLD FINDING OF MN0 MARKET" AND/OR 
"NO INCOME" DATA IS AN ABSOLUTE PRERE-
QUISITE TO INVOCATION OF THE "SPECIALTY" 
OR "SPECIAL USE" (COST LESS DEPRECIATION) 
FORMULA 
What has been referred to as ". . . the meat of the 
[specialty] rule" (Van Mol v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 
402 P.2d 320, 322 (Kan. 1965)) is a threshold finding, by the 
Court, that there is "ftlhe absence of market value, in the sense 
that there is a lack of evidence of comparable sales ..." (Id at 
321) . Only "f i1n the absence of market value, because the special 
type of property is not commonly bought and sold . . . " may the 
formula be utilized, (id. at 322) (emphasis is that of the Court) . 
Where a building is shown to be able to produce income from a 
source other than the proposed "special use", the cost less 
depreciation formula is unavailable as a matter of law. (In Re New 
York Citv Terminal Market, 244 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000-1001 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 
1963); People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 83 N.E.2d 
839 (N.Y.Supp.Ct. 1964); Matter of New York (Maxwell), 222 N.Y.S.2d 
786, 802-803 (1964).) In this case, the Landowners' own appraiser 
found five properties he considered as "comparable" and based his 
opinion on that data, never offering a scintilla of evidence of 
"income" production or "cost less depreciation" used in the unique 
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or specialty property valuations. Landowners made the "argument" 
that the property was unique, but then proceeded to value it using 
market sales of commercial properties—thereby rebutting 
themselves! 
D. UTAH DECISIONS INVOKING THE RULE 
Utah has recognized utilization of the inherent value or value 
as used theory, but has also noted that its application is invoked 
solely because no market exists for valuing the property in any 
other method. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 
566 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1977) the court noted that: 
11
. . . there were no sales on the open market of 
water or water rights in the aquifer basin in which 
Defendant's property was located, and thus no 
market value in the usual sense of the term." (Id. 
at 1242, citing, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt 
Lake County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938 (1952); 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 
P.2d 693 (1960); and 4 NICHOLS, Eminent Domain. 
§12.-32(3) (b) at 12.377-78 (3d ed.) 
The Utah Wool Pulling Court expressly found that the business 
involved with usage of the water was truly "unique": 
"There is ample evidence in the record that 
defendants operation was in fact specialty 
property. It appears that defendant operated one 
of the few wool pulling operations in the nation." 
(Supra at 1244.) 
Without the prerequisite findings of "specialty" and "no market" 
data, utilization of the "value to the owner" is reversible error: 
"The appellant also claims it was error for the 
Court to allow the landowner to testify that the 
-12-
property was worth $120,000 to $125,000. The basis 
he gave for the value was: 'Well, it is my life's 
work and it provided me a good living. . . . I know 
what it is worth to me.' Counsel then asked the 
witness: 'And is that what your testimony is based 
on, Mr. Johnson, is that what the subject property 
is worth to you?' and the witness answered, 'yes.' 
The basis upon which the owner stated the value of 
the property was not permitted by law. What the 
property is worth to a seller is not a correct 
basis for an opinion." (Utah State Road Comm'n v. 
Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976), citing U.S. 
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 
L.Ed. 729 (1946).) 
V. 
THE COURT PROPERLY VALUED THE "TAKE" AT ITS 
"HIGHEST AND BEST USE" (COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT) AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADD, 
INCREMENTALLY, "VALUES" FOR ADDITIONAL "USES" 
The value of the "taken" property must be ascertained by 
determining its "highest and best use." The City's appraiser 
determined that use to be as a commercial development. The 
Landowner had previously used it as vacant property, but upon which 
he located a sign pointing eastward to where his auto salvage 
business was located. The sign was visible from Riverdale Road 
(Def.Exh. 6). The Landowner wants compensation for the 
"incremental" value of a "sign site." But the City's appraiser 
properly pointed out that the "take" piece was valued at $3.00 per 
sq. ft. as "commercially developable property"; that is, 
unencumbered with a sign lease in the front of the property which 
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would impede its development. Obviously, no reasonably prudent 
buyer would buy a piece of commercial property for development at 
premium price if he had to leave the frontage open as a "sign 
site." The City's appraisal also made no "reduction" for a sign 
site leasehold along the frontage. Even the Landowner's appraiser 
acknowledged that the "take" property, at his $4.50 per sq. ft. 
price of $15,500, represented its full market value and it would be 
improper to add to that "$6,500 as a sign site" (T.94). It's one 
or the other, but not both. 
Moreover, there was no competent testimony from anyone in this 
case as to the fair market value of a "sign site." The Landowner's 
appraiser merely asked other business owners to "place a value" on 
such a sign site (T.53). The Court allowed the testimony over the 
City's objection as hearsay, indicating it went to "weight" rather 
than to "admissibility," but ultimately held against the Landowner 
on that issue (T.53-54). The Court should never have admitted the 
testimony to begin with: 
"Defendants here have attempted to get before the 
jury declarations of third parties as to value not 
supported by oath and not subject to cross-
examination. As hearsay, this is clearly 
inadmissible." (Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Jones, 694 
P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah 1984).) 
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VI. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT INTEREST 
ACCRUED AS PROVIDED BY THE STATUTE 
Landowners seek interest on this judgment at 12% per annum 
from the date of the "take" and cite (Utah State Road Comm'n v. 
Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1983) for authority. Fribera is, 
itself, an aberration and lends no support to Landowner's position. 
A divided court in Fribera took "judicial notice" that in the 
double-digit inflationary years of the mid- to late 1970's, 
property values in Salt Lake County "increased substantially" (Id. 
at 835), thereby causing an unconstitutional denial of due process 
by valuing property on the "date of service of summons" (June 23, 
1972) in a trial scheduled some time in the early 1980's. 
Fribergs wanted to "contest" the right to take and therefore 
left in Court the funds deposited under §78-34-9. They then, in 
fact, contested the take and the proceedings continued for more 
than a decade. This court noted: 
"Suffice it to state that valuation as of the 
service of summons date will be the rule, and 
departure from that rule will be the exception. 
Finally, it should be noted that the presumption 
established by §78-34-11 may be rebutted either by 
the State or by the property owner by showing that 
a valuation as of the date of service of summons 
would result in an award that would not provide 
'just compensation' to a landowner or be fair to 
the State. It follows that the burden to rebut the 
presumption established by §78-34-1 is on the party 
which asserts that valuation as of the date of 
service of summons would be unfair." (Id. at 832.) 
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In this case, the Landowners offered no evidence that land values 
had "substantially increased" between September, 1988 (date of 
service of the summons) and November 19, 1992 (date of trial). 
Moreover, Landowners repeatedly resisted efforts to consolidate the 
condemnation case with a companion quiet title action, and expedite 
the trial of this matter. (R.139, 147, 185). 
It cannot be seriously argued that Landowners left the 
deposited funds in court so as to "preserve" their right to 
challenge the "right to take." Landowners never offered a single 
witness or document contesting the "right to take." Their 
examination of Mr. Holmes never really questioned the necessity of 
this public street (T.20-22). The "right to take" was "submitted" 
to the Court on "uncontroverted" evidence (T.23). Landowners 
needlessly left funds on deposit which could and should have been 
withdrawn after the road was completed in 1989. There is no reason 
for the Court to look for a constitutional mandate to create an 
"exception" to the UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-9 in regards to the rate 
of interest on monies ultimately awarded in excess of the deposited 
funds as it did in Fribera based upon the extraordinary 
circumstances involved in that case.3 
3Even in Fribera, a divided court did not alter the interest 
rate on the judgment, but merely the date of valuation. (Id. at 
835[31] last sentence.) 
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VII. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE EXTENSION OF 700 
WEST IN ANY WAY AFFECTED ALLEGED "POTENTIAL" 
DRAINAGE PROBLEMS 
In building the Riverdale City offices in 1986, the City 
extended and widened 4600 South past the Crabtree Auto Salvage Yard 
and placed a catch basin to carry storm runoff (see Map, 
Appellant's Brief, p.7). That was completed in 1986. Landowners, 
in this condemnation action, assert a claim for "potential" flood 
damage likely to occur in the future because the catch basin is 
"too high" and otherwise inadequate. They cite Utah Dept. of 
Trans, v. Jones. 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984) as authority. 
The problem with this argument is two-fold. The engineering 
complained of involved a prior project done in 1986. The extension 
of 700 West did not impact the engineering and construction of 
storm water facilities along 4600 South and there was no expert 
testimony that the "take" for 700 West in any way impacted water 
runoff. 
In Jones, the Court merely held that UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-
10(2)4 applies to condemnation actions and permits analysis of 
4
"(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only 
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portio not sought to be condemned by reason of its seerance from 
the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-34-10(2) (emphasis added) 
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claims arising by the "construction" of the improvement (Id. at 
1034) . 
Secondly, following construction of the roadway, no water 
problem has ever occurred, and the Court determined the claim 
"highly speculative" (R.220). There is no competent testimony in 
this case of either reasonable probability of future problem or 
actual, non-speculative damages likely to occur. The landowners 
simply failed in their burden on this claim. 
VIII. 
THE CONCRETE RETAINING WALL WAS NOT AN 
IMPROVEMENT WHICH ADDED VALUE TO THE LAND AND 
ANY "DAMAGE" TO THE WALL IS PROPERLY ADDRESSED 
IN THE JUDGMENT 
Landowners seek an increase in the award by $21,200 as the 
"value" of a concrete retaining wall which is constructed on the 
"take" property and extends east and west onto property which the 
landowners own. Sixty-six feet of the wall had to be removed for 
the widening of the roadway. However, even the Landowners' 
appraiser acknowledged that the concrete wall contributes nothing 
to the value of the land (T. 83-84). 
According to an engineering report, the wall is unstable, of 
poor quality, and should be removed (Ex. 11). The Court properly 
determined that the City had some limited obligation as a result of 
cutting the wall, i.e. , to "shore up" its two fresh cuts and return 
the wall to at least its precondemnation condition (R.219). When 
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the City and Landowers could not agree upon the amount of "cure" 
damage following the trial, the matter was brought back before the 
Court. The Landowner failed to appear after proper notice (R.227, 
28) and the Court determined that the additional "damages" to shore 
up a wall, which contributes nothing to the value of the land and 
should otherwise be removed as unsafe, was $600 (R,229, 231-32). 
Such additional sum became part of the Judgment of Just 
Compensation. 
IX. 
THE LANDOWNERS' SIGN WAS NOT DAMAGED, AND 
REMAINS AS DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY 
A sign used by Landowners located on the "take" property was 
removed by the City. It was placed upon the Landowners' property 
awaiting directions as to its ultimate reuse or other disposition. 
The Defendants did not respond and the Court determined that it was 
not otherwise "damaged" as a result of the "take." (Ex. 7; R.220.) 
X. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THERE WAS NO 
"SEVERANCE" DAMAGE TO THE REMAINING PROPERTY 
The "severed" parcel is approximately 37' x 115' at its east 
end and 29' x 115' at its west end (T.95). Before the take it was 
used as parking for properties owned by Crabtree and fronting on 
700 West labeled "other Crabtree property" in Appellants Brief, 
p.7, Illustration I (T.90). Its utility as a parking lot is 
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unaffected by the condemnation (T.91). Patrons of the business 
facilities adjacent to this property can still park on the property 
as they had previously done. A building could never have been 
built on the property before the condemnation because of inadequate 
space considering the appropriate zoning setback requirements 
(T.158-59). Mr. Froer opined that the increased value to the 
severed piece occasioned by the improvements and extension of 700 
West completely "offset" (as permitted by UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-
10(4)) any claim for "severance" (T.160-61). 
SUMMARY 
The Judgment of Just Compensation is within the "range of 
evidence" of value testified to by experts. As the trier of fact, 
the trial court's determination of value is entitled to stand if it 
is within "range or compass of evidence." (State Road Comm'n v. 
Hopkins, 29 Utah 2d 131, 507 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1973); State Road 
Comm'n v. Tacrcrart. 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967).) The 
Landowners have the burden of proof as to a value (Id.; Utah Road 
Comm'n v. Hansen. 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); Tanner v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irrig. Co., 40 Utah 105, 118, 121 P. 584, 589 
(1911)). The Landowners failed to sustain their burden in proving 
damages in excess of the judgment and the District Courts decision 
should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?1 day of October, 1993. 
Q 
\ 1 
L- _ E t ^ _ 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee RIVERDALE CITY 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following, 
first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
Donald C, Hughes 
795 - 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Z.7*-this of October, 1993, 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIVERDALE CITY, a municipal ; 
Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, et al. , 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Case No. 880903546 
,
 D£t;
 2 8 1992 
Riverdale City filed condemnation proceedings to 
property belonging to Crabtree Auto Company in order to extend 7 00 
West Street to connect with 1050 West in Riverdale City, consistent 
with its master plan. Under an order of occupancy issued by the 
court on June 20, 1989, this extension has been accomplished. 
The property taken was authorized by law and the taking 
of the property was necessary for that use. The plaintiff is 
therefore entitled to possession and ownership of the condemned 
property. 
In determining the amount of just compensation to 
Crabtree Auto, the court must determine the value of the condemned 
property and the amount of the damage, if any, to the remaining 
land, or severance damage. The value of the condemned property is 
its highest and best use at the time of the taking on September 23, 
1988, when the plaintiff's summons was served. In condemnation 
Memorandum Decision 
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proceedings, the landowner has the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence to establish the highest and best use 
of the property. The defendant's evidence seemed to focus on the 
value of the use of the property as part of its salvage business. 
This approach is incorrect. A fair market value of the property is 
not driven by the value of the property to the owner, but its 
highest and best use. 
The court finds that the highest and best use of the 
property at the time of the taking was a commercial use of $3.00 
per square foot, probably for parking in connection with the 
businesses to the north of the property (which is property also 
owned by defendant) and for use in connection with the defendant's 
salvage business to the east of the property, consistent with its 
prior uses. Applying that monetary value to approximately 3,302.32 
square feet within the subject property, the amount of damages 
would be $9,907 or, rounded off, $10,000 for the defendant, 
exclusive of severance damage. 
The court grants no severance damage, except for the wall 
(discussed below), because it finds the difference between the 
value of the property prior to the taking and the value of the 
remaining property after the taking to be essentially the same. 
Prior to the taking, the property just to the east of the taking 
was used for storage of vehicles; the property just to the west of 
the taking was used for parking by the businesses to the north of 
the property and occasionally for vehicle storage for defendant's 
Memorandum Decision 
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business. These basic uses will continue. Because a 50 foot 
setback is required for commercially zoned property and an 80 foot 
setback for a manufacturing zoned property (which is the way it is 
presently zoned), no building could have been constructed on the 
property before, nor will that be possible in the future. 
Removal of a section of the wall for 700 West Street has 
left the remainder of the two sections of the wall unstable and, 
perhaps, unsafe. The court was not impressed, however, that it was 
an expensively installed wall to begin with. Its inherent 
deficiencies were noted in ARW Engineer's report. (See defendant's 
exhibit 11.) The engineer recommended removal of the wall. 
Nonetheless, it was a functional wall. Because the court recalls 
no testimony regarding only the cost of bracing the wall from 
either end, the court will order that the plaintiff bear the 
reasonable cost of bracing the wall on both ends abutting 700 West 
Street, in much the same fashion as the wall was braced at each end 
before the wall was cut prior to the taking, by a perpendicular 
slab or some other sensible approach. Alternatively, the cost of 
such bracing shall be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to 
defray the cost of moving the wall, which, according to the 
engineer, can be removed with little effort. If the parties cannot 
agree on the reasonable costs of bracing the wall, the court will 
hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
The court allows no damage for the sign site on the 
condemned property. The law allows damages computed only for the 
Memorandum Decision 
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highest and best use, and putting a sign on the property is not its 
highest and best use. The court's award of damages of $10,000 for 
the condemned property is the only appropriate measure of damages 
on this issue. 
The court likewise grants no damage for the sign. The 
defendant could have removed the sign if it had value or without 
incurring expenses, if it would have responded to the plaintiff's 
reasonable requests for directions on where to put the removed 
sign. The plaintiff asked the defendant where it wanted the sign 
put when it was removed from the condemned site, but it could never 
get any answer from the defendant. Therefore the city laid it to 
the side of the road, which was reasonable under the circumstances. 
If the sign was subsequently damaged, and the court was not 
persuaded that it was damaged in looking at plaintiff's exhibit No. 
7, it was caused by the defendant's inaction or lack of cooperation 
in giving direction to the plaintiff on the relocation of the sign 
•once the city was given occupation of the condemned property. 
Furthermore, the court suspects that its real value, which no 
longer exists, was to aid motorists to find the salvage business to 
the east of the sign looking down 700 West Street from Riverdale 
Road. (See plaintiff's exhibit 6.) 
The court believes that it is highly speculative to conclude 
that the installation of the storm sewer and its surrounding paving 
of the property exacerbated a potential water problem, just because 
there was some flooding in 1986. Therefore, the court grants no 
Memorandum Decision 
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damages for this claim. If flooding occurs in the future, and the 
defendant is persuaded that the flooding was caused by the paving 
or any other way in which the plaintiff handled the catch basins 
and storm sewers, the defendant can file a claim against the 
plaintiff at that time. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare appropriate findings, 
conclusions, and a judgment consistent with this decision, which is 
intended only as a framework for the preparation of the final 
documents. Alternatively, a judgment only for the court's 
signature can be prepared if both parties can stipulate that no 
appeal will be filed. 
Dated this day of December, 1992. 
MICHAEL D. LYON, Judgfc 
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RIVERDALE CITY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIVERDALE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF JUST 
COMPENSATION 
< % 
% 
Case No. CV-354688 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Court on November 9, 1992, the Plaintiff being present and 
represented by Douglas J. Holmes, Esq., Riverdale City 
Attorney and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., and the Defendants being 
present and represented by Donald C. Hughes, Esq., the Court 
having heard the testimony and reviewed the exhibits presented 
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at said trial, and having taking the matter under advisement, 
and having fully considered the matter, and having rendered 
its MEMORANDUM DECISION on December 24, 1992, and the matter 
having come back before the Court pursuant to the Court's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and NOTICE on May 27, 1993 at the hour of 
11:30 a.m., the Plaintiff being represented by Douglas Holmes, 
Esq. and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., the Defendant neither 
appearing nor being represented by Counsel; the Court having 
heard the testimony of an engineer concerning the costs of 
shoring the concrete wall cut as part of the roadway 
extension; the Court being duly advised in the premises and 
good cause appearing therefor; now enters its JUDGMENT OF JUST 
COMPENSATION as follows: 
1. The property herein sought to be acquired by eminent 
domain is one authorized by law and the acquisition is for a 
public purpose. 
2. The property being acquired is approximately 
3,302.32 sq.ft. in size, and had a fair market value on the 
date of take of $10,000. 
3. The Defendant is not entitled to severance damages 
as a result of this condemnation, or other damages arising 
therefrom, other than the cost of bracing the wall, which 
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J I previously traversed the property being acquired and was cut 
to accommodate the road extension. The Court finds that the 
cost to brace said wall is the sum of $600. 
4. Defendant is therefore entitled to a JUDGMENT OF 
JUST COMPENSATION for the property taken and all of the 
D 61 
7 
8 
q damages associated with the take as follows: 
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(a) $10,000 for the property taken; 
(b) $600 for damages to the existing wall; 
for a total sum of $10,600. The Clerk of the Court is hereby 
directed to return to Plaintiff the $13,875 deposited pursuant 
to the ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY issued herein on June 20, 
1989 and all accrued interest thereof, less Court 
administrative expenses, for use by the Plaintiff to satisfy 
the Judgment entered herein with all excess funds to remain 
the exclusive property of the Plaintiff. 
5. Upon payment in full of said JUDGMENT OF JUST 
COMPENSATION, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to entry of a 
FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION vesting title to the subject 
property, by eminent domain, in the Plaintiff. 
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BY THE COURT: 
Michae l D. L y o n / 
rO^-
Michae   Lyon 
District Court Judge 
THIS JUDGMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION WAS SUBMITTED TO DEFEN-
DANTS' COUNSEL FOR APPROVAL FOR MORE THAN FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO 
SiffiMISSION TO\THISiCOURT. j+w+uA th~2 
Harold A. H i n t z e 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIVERDALE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
HON. MICHAEL D. LYON 
Date: May 27, 1993 
Case no. 880903546 
Dean 01sen, Reporter 
Maureen Magagna, Clerk 
HEARING 
Harold A. Hintze and Douglas J. Holmes are present 
representing plaintiff; defendant is not present nor represented 
by counsel. 
Mr. Hintze addresses the Court. 
Larry Gilson, engineer, is sworn and testifies. 
The Court orders that the fair and reasonable cost of the 
wall is $600.00, to be paid by Riverdale City to Crabtree. This 
amount may be used to shore up the wall or defray the cost of 
removing the wall, pursuant to the Court's original order. 
Mr. Hintze explains the order prepared regarding the funds 
on deposit. 
Mr. Hintze will send a copy of the proposed order to Mr. 
Hughes prior to submitting it to the Court. 
